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ABSTRACT 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) have been integral to U.S. military operations in 
times of war and peace. Using radio broadcasts, leaflets, loudspeakers, and other forms of 
media, the U.S. has directed PSYOP toward influencing the behavior of a target audience 
(TA), in order to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning in support of 
the accomplishment of national aims and objectives.  During war, tactical PSYOP is used 
to lower enemies‘ will to fight and ultimately lead them to surrender.  Academics and 
practitioners have written a large body of literature over the last seventy years that 
addresses both successful and unsuccessful PSYOP.  There has also been a large body of 
literature written about communication theory.  What the literature fails to do is to 
address the important linkage between PSYOP and communication theory and how the 
relationship between the two affects the success or failure of PSYOP.  Drawing from 
communication theory literature, this thesis builds a model for evaluating PSYOP 
products during the development phase.  The thesis then applies this PSYOP model to 
Psychological Operations during the 1950–1953 Korean War, in an attempt to identify 
the conditions under which PSYOP products are crafted and deployed successfully. 
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Psychological Operations (PSYOP) have been used, to some extent, in almost 
every type of conflict since biblical times. During times of war and times of peace, it is 
directed toward the behavior of a target audience (TA), in order to influence their 
emotions, motives, and objective reasoning in support of the accomplishment of national 
aims and objectives.1 During war, tactical PSYOP is used to lower enemies‘ will to fight 
and ultimately lead them to surrender. The importance of PSYOP can be seen in its 
elevated use throughout the 20th and into the 21st century.  Beginning in World War I, 
the United States has tasked a number of organizations to conduct PSYOP, including the 
Propaganda Sub-Section, established in 1918, the Office of War Information (OWI), 
created in 1942,  the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), established 
in 1951, and since 1967, the 4
th
 Psychological Operations Group (POG). 
 In its use of PSYOP, the United States has learned that, in order to influence the 
behavior of a target audience, one must properly plan the operation in order for it to be 
successful. However, more than just planning is required in order for PSYOP to be 
successful; it is also important to consider the best medium for sending the message, the 
receptiveness of the target audience, and the creation of metrics to evaluate the success of 
the operation.  Literature on communications theory is particularly useful for 
understanding the necessary conditions that make planning and executing PSYOP 
successful. In this thesis, I will conduct research on communication theory and 
Psychological Operations, in particular its use during the Korean War, in an attempt to 
better understand what makes for successful psychological operations.  The aim of this 
research is to help inform the planning process of future operations in order to execute 
successful PSYOP. 
                                                 
1 William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University, 1958), 2. 
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A. BACKGROUND 
A considerable body of literature has been written over the last seventy years that 
describes cases of PSYOP and communication theory.  There are a number of books and 
reports written on PSYOP during the Korean War, the first great Cold War conflict, and 
one in which PSYOP were prominently featured.  Stephen Pease, George Pettee, Stanley 
Sandler, Herbert Friedman, and Alfred Paddock provide the information needed to 
describe who was responsible for the planning and execution of PSYOP, how it was 
employed, and the effects it had on the target audience during the Korean War.  However, 
these authors do not focus sufficiently on the importance of PSYOP messaging and how 
it relates to the successfulness or unsuccessfulness of an operation.2 
Communication theory literature offers a great deal of information on what makes 
for successful communication. Communication models by Harold Lasswell, Claude 
Shannon and Warren Weaver, Wilber Schramm, and David Berlo provide the foundation 
for the PSYOP model that will be introduced in this thesis, in particular, the importance 
of the source, message, medium, and receiver.3  However, surprisingly little has been 
written that identifies the practical use of communication models in PSYOP planning. 
For example, Philip Katz gives a comprehensive detail of communication theory and how 
it relates to PSYOP but does not identify a way to use communication models in PSYOP 
                                                 
2 Stephen E. Pease, PSYWAR:  Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953 (Harrisburg:  Stackpole 
Books, 1992);  George S. Pettee, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-3:  US PSYWAR Operations in the 
Korean War (Chevy Chase, Maryland:  Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951);  
Stanley Sandler, ―Cease Resistance:  It’s Good For You!”:  A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological 
Operations (Fort Bragg, NC:  U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 
9, 1999); Herbert A. Friedman, ―OPERATION MOOLAH:  The Plot to Steal a MiG-15,‖ Accessed May 
07, 2011.   http://www.psywarrior.com/Moolah.html; Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its 
Origins (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002).  
3 Harold D. Lasswell, ―The Structure and Function of Communication in Society,‖ The 
Communication of Ideas, edited by Lyman Bryson (New York:  Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 
Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1948), 37;  Claude F. Shannon and Warren Weaver, The 
Mathematical Theory of Communication, (Urbana, Ill.: The University of Illinois Press, 1964) p. 7;  Wilbur 
Schramm, ―How Communication Works,‖ The Process and Effects of Communication (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1954); David K. Berlo, The Process of Communication (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and 
Winston, 1960).  
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planning.4  This thesis aims to address these shortcomings by creating a model and 
matrix, using the PSYOP messaging variables, to evaluate PSYOP planning and 
operations. 
Specifically, this thesis argues that, in order to understand what causes PSYOP to 
be successful or unsuccessful one must look at the source‘s in-depth knowledge of the 
TA, the message being sent, the medium that is used to send the message, and the 
receptivity of the TA.5  These variables, drawn from communications theory, are 
necessary for PSYOP to be successful, but to what degree? Is one of these variables more 
important than another for successful PSYOP?   Do all four variables have to be strong or 
can one or more variables be weak and still achieve the desired effects of the operation?  
This thesis aims to investigate these questions in order to better understand successful 
planning and execution of PSYOP operations. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Building from literature on PSYOP and communication theory, this thesis begins 
by defining what PSYOP is and identifies four variables that are necessary for successful 
PSYOP messaging: in-depth knowledge of the target audience, a clear message, the 
correct medium, and the receptiveness of the target audience.  These four variables make 
up a PSYOP model and matrix which will be used to evaluate U.S. PSYOP operations 
during the Korean War, in particular Operation MOOLAH, which aimed to encourage the 
defection of a MiG-15 fighter pilot with his aircraft, and the U.S. military‘s use of leaflets 
and loudspeakers to spread PSYOP messages during the war. 
The Korean War is an ideal case to test the PSYOP model and matrix for several 
reasons. First, there is an abundance of literature written, not only on the Korean War, but 
also on the use of PSYOP throughout the conflict.  Second, since the Korean War took 
                                                 
4 See ―PSYOP and Communication Theory‖ by Philip Katz, taken from The Art and Science of 
Psychological Operations:  Case Studies of Military Application (Washington: American Institute for 
Research, 1976), 20–39. 
5 Although there are a number of variables present during PSYOP, the four that have been chosen 
coincide with the variables within communication theory.  These variables are identified in communication 
theory and make communication successful. 
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place over fifty years ago, there has been enough time to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
PSYOP that took place.  Also, documents that were otherwise secret have been made 
available for study.   Third, according to Arend Lijphart, a single case study such as the 
Korean conflict is a valid and important means of testing theories.  ―The great advantage 
of the case study is that by focusing on a single case, that case can be intensively 
examined…Indirectly, however, case studies can make an important contribution to the 
establishment of general propositions and thus to theory-building.‖6 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II offers a definition of PSYOP, drawn 
from U.S. Army manuals, and offers a brief overview of PSYOP‘s history, particularly 
since World War I. Chapter III uses communication theory to develop a PSYOP model 
and matrix, arguing that four variables are particularly important for understanding the 
success of PSYOP products: in-depth knowledge of the target audience, the clarity of the 
message, the medium used to send the message, and the receptiveness of the TA to the 
message. Chapter IV uses the PSYOP model and matrix to evaluate U.S. PSYOP during 
the Korean War, specifically Operation MOOLAH and the use of leaflets and 
loudspeakers.  Chapter V will draw general conclusions and their implications for 
PSYOP today. 
                                                 
6 Arend Lijphart, ―Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,‖ The American Political 
Science Review, (1971):  691, accessed May 26, 2011, 
http://campus.murraystate.edu/academic/faculty/mark.wattier/Lijphart1971.pdf. 
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II. WHAT IS PSYOP?  
From the time they were founded in 1775 and 1776, the United States Army and 
the government of the United States  have used many forms of media to send well-crafted 
and sometimes not-so-well crafted messages to populations around the world.  These 
messages were intended to persuade, influence, and/or change the behavior of 
populations or target audiences in favor of U.S. objectives.  Crafted during times of war 
and during times of peace, these messages have been the backbone of U.S. strategic 
communications, public diplomacy, and psychological operations. Strategic 
communications and public diplomacy have been used extensively to inform foreign 
populations about the United States, and Psychological Operations have been used 
extensively during wartime to lower the morale of enemy combatants. 
This chapter offers a brief history of Psychological Operations, including its 
definition, how PSYOP messaging is developed, the roles it plays in U.S. military 
operations and in support of embassy activities, and its evolution since World War I. 
A. DEFINING PSYOP 
 Psychological Operations (PSYOP)7 is the term that has been used the longest to 
describe how the U.S. Army uses selected media to send messages and influence target 
audiences.  PSYOP has outlived the terms ―propaganda‖ and ―psychological warfare‖ 
(PSYWAR) by more than twenty years each. Just as the term PSYOP has changed over 
the years, which will be discussed later in this chapter, the definition has also changed.  
Broadly defined, PSYOP is the actions taken by an organization to decrease an enemy‘s 
morale and efficiency, lower their will to fight, and ultimately cause them to surrender.  
In order to disseminate the selected information, the organization develops a product or 
message, which can be audio, visual, or combination of both, and decides on the 
appropriate media that will have maximum effect in reaching the target audience. 
                                                 
7 Most recently, the U.S. Army has proposed changing the name of PSYOP to Military Information 
Support Operations (MISO). While the new term is still being debated, this thesis will continue to use the 
term PSYOP. 
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In the United States Army, the organization that conducts PSYOP is the 4
th
 
Psychological Operations Group (POG).  The units within the 4
th
 POG conduct PSYOP 
across the range of military operations and, according to Field Manuel 3-05.301, 
[PSYOP] are the ―planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to 
foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and 
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.  
The purpose of Psychological Operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and 
behavior favorable to the originator‘s objectives.‖8  In order to influence foreign TAs, 
PSYOP is employed across all instruments of national power to include diplomatic, 
information, economic measures, and military operations. 
PSYOP is used to amplify the effects of military operations.  Used during 
offensive and defensive operations, PSYOP is employed to hasten the eventual defeat of 
enemy forces through a number of ways, including undermining the will of the enemy to 
resist and, undercutting the credibility of enemy leadership, increasing unrest among the 
civilian population in enemy areas, fostering desertion or surrender of enemy forces, 
reducing civilian interference with military operations, increasing acceptance of friendly 
forces in occupied territory, and countering enemy propaganda.9  Also used during 
stability operations, PSYOP supports counterterrorism, noncombatant evacuation 
operations, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and humanitarian 
assistance. 
Current military doctrine calls for a seven-phase PSYOP process.  ―The seven-
phase PSYOP process is a standardized, nonlinear framework by which PSYOP are 
planned and conducted in support of a broad range of missions.‖10  Phase I, or planning, 
is where the Psychological Operations objectives (PO), supporting Psychological 
Operations objectives, potential target audiences, initial assessment criteria, and baseline 
                                                 
8  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Process 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, August 2007, Glossary-8.  
9  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.30: Psychological Operations, April 
2005, 2-3. 
10  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations 
Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, August 2007, viii. 
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data are identified.  The PO is ―a general statement of measurable response that reflects 
the desired behavioral change of foreign TAs… [a Supporting Psychological Operations 
Objective] SPO is the specific behavioral response desired from the target audience to 
accomplish a given PO.‖11  In order to accomplish the PO, two or more supporting 
PSYOP objectives are needed. 
Phase II, or target audience analysis, is where ―the PSYOP arguments used (the 
overall argument and approach to obtain the desired behavior from the TA) and 
recommended actions that the U.S. military and its allies can take to influence the 
behavior of selected foreign audiences‖12 are identified.  Also during this phase, the 
medium that will be used to carry the message to the TA will be identified. PSYOP 
planners use the best medium to disseminate the message to the TA.  There are a number 
of mediums that are identified that have the capability to disseminate or communicate the 
message, including  face-to-face communication, broadcast communication such as radio 
and television, print material such as newspaper, handbills, leaflets, and posters, and 
digital dissemination such as the Internet. 
Phase III, or series development, is where a ―complex, creative, and collaborative 
process that creates synergy between multiple products and actions to achieve the desired 
behavior change for a single target audience‖13 takes place.  Series development is the 
bringing together of a number of products or messages that will aid in the 
accomplishment of a single SPO.  It usually takes more than one product or message to 
change the behavior of a single TA. 
Phase IV, or product development and design, is when the product/action 
worksheet is created using information from phases I through III.  The worksheet ―is a 
source document and conceptual tool for creating products [messages] and providing 
guidance for pretest and posttest questionnaires.‖14 
                                                 
11  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations 
Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, August 2007, 1-26–1-27. 
12  Ibid., 2-1. 
13  Ibid., 3-1. 
14  Ibid., 4-1. 
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Phase V, or approval, is where the PSYOP series goes through an internal review 
board, after pretesting and appropriate changes are made to the products, and then 
―staffed out for review and signature by the official approval authority.‖15 
After approval is granted, Phase VI begins.  Phase VI, or production, distribution, 
and dissemination is where the products [messages] are mass produced, moved to the 
dissemination point, and then is disseminated, which is ―the actual delivery of the 
PSYOP message to the TA.‖16 
Post-testing of products also takes place during this phase, which ―helps the 
PSYOP Soldiers determine which products in the series are reaching the TA, what 
portions of the PSYOP argument are resonating with the TA, and what degree of 
influence the PSYOP series has on the TA.‖17  With the information obtained during post 
testing, products can be modified or dropped from the series if they are not achieving the 
desired effects on the TA. 
Phase VII, or evaluation, is the ―process for evaluating [the] achievement of [the] 
SPOs and assessing the overall impact of [the] PSYOP series on [the] TA behavior.‖18  
PSYOP evaluation is achieved through the monitoring of impact indicators, which 
answer the assessment criteria questions.  ―PSYOP assessment criteria are the objective 
measures used to monitor and assess changes in TA behavior over time…impact 
indicators are specific, measureable, and observable behavior performed by the 
TA…analysis of the impact indicators over time will show behavior trends, which 
determine whether the SPOs are being achieved.‖19 
In addition to its military mission, PSYOP provides support to ambassadors and 
country teams in order to reinforce diplomatic efforts through a number of operations 
including counterdrug operations, humanitarian mine action, and peace building.  United 
                                                 
15  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations 
Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, August 2007, 5-1. 
16  Ibid., 6-9. 
17  Ibid., 6-17. 
18  Ibid., 7-1. 
19  Ibid., 7-2. 
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States government information efforts are supported by PSYOP under the auspice of 
military support to public diplomacy (MSPD).20  Since foreign audiences are often 
targeted by specific information, PSYOP has been used more frequently by the U.S. 
government.  For example, PSYOP can be used to support economic measures in the 
establishment of an exclusion zone.  Exclusion zones can be established in the air (no-fly 
zone), sea (maritime), or on land to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic 
area.21  PSYOP can be used to inform and influence the target audience to act or not act 
within that zone.  Historically, most of the information written about PSYOP is about 
PSYOP in support of military operations. 
B. CRAFTING THE PSYOP MESSAGE 
 PSYOP messaging consists of four variables: in-depth knowledge of the TA, the 
message, the medium and the receptiveness of the TA. 
The first variable present is the in-depth knowledge of the TA.  Studying the 
enemy before and during conflict gives the PSYOP planner the necessary knowledge to 
properly employ PSYOP against it.  Learning everything they can about the culture, 
attitudes, emotions, values, and ethics gives valuable insights as to why the TA behaves 
the way it does.  In order to change the behavior of the TA, one must understand why the 
TA behaves the way it does.   An in-depth knowledge of the TA allows the PSYOP 
planner the ability to understand the behavior and what they need to do to change it. 
 Initial research on the area of operation which the TA is in should have already 
been conducted.  ―PSYOP [planners] should keep abreast of current events and study the 
history, culture, society, and political makeup of their respective target countries or 
regions to increase their awareness of long-standing and emerging PSYOP-relevant 
issues.‖22  This initial research allows the PSYOP planner to have a base knowledge of 
the TA and its surroundings.  To build on this base knowledge, the PSYOP planner 
                                                 
20  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.30: Psychological Operations, April 
2005, 2-2. 
21  Ibid., 2-5.  
22  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations 
Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, August 2007, 2-1. 
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conducts in-depth research on the TA during Phase II, Target Audience Analysis.  
Researching PSYOP-specific intelligence, open source information, supported unit 
documentation, finished intelligence products, and special PSYOP studies and 
assessments by the Strategic Studies Detachment (SSD) allows the PSYOP planner to 
identify the conditions, vulnerabilities, susceptibility, and accessibility of the TA which 
will allow them to effectively target the required behavioral change.23  The PSYOP 
planner will also identify any differences in meaning between the TA‘s and planner‘s 
language.  The differences of meanings in languages, called semantics, can cause the TA 
to misunderstand the PSYOP message.  If the TA misunderstands the PSYOP message, 
then there is a possibility that the message will not achieve the desired behavioral change 
that it was intended to do. 
The second variable present is the message.  Crafting a message is a difficult task 
and current doctrine does not give enough guidance on how to craft a message.  Field 
Manual 3-05.301, dated 2007, gives step-by-step instructions on how to develop the 
PSYOP argument, supporting argument, appeal, techniques, and primary influence tactics 
that will be directed towards the TA.  The field manual states, ―the main argument is the 
reason that the TA should engage in the desired behavior…the supporting arguments are 
used to provide factual evidence, address causes and effects, and exploit 
vulnerabilities…an appeal is the overall approach used to present the main 
argument…techniques refer to the specific methods used to present information to the 
TA… [and] primary influence tactics will magnify the persuasiveness of PSYOP 
products and actions.‖24  The field manual, however, does not explain how to link them 
together and develop the appropriate message.  However, it does state that the PSYOP 
argument ―is not a slogan or tagline and does not provide the specific message or 
wording for individual product development, which is conducted in Phase IV.‖25 
                                                 
23 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Process 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, August 2007, 2-1. 
24  Ibid., 2-23, 2-27. 
25  Ibid., 2–24. 
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The word ―message‖ is used sixty-seven times throughout Phase IV, but nowhere 
in the field manual does it explain how to craft the message.  It does cover how and 
where the message should be inserted or displayed on the product that is being 
disseminated, whether it is audio, visual, or a combination of both.  Dealing with print 
products, the most useful information on messages that Phase IV provides is ―factors 
contributing to effective message writing include the following:  a good practical 
knowledge of the TA language, recent residence in the target location and familiarity 
with current happenings in that area, familiarity with the organization of the TA‘s 
leadership, equipment, and arms, familiarity with the civilian population and the political, 
sociological, economic and psychological environment, and access to personnel with 
experience in advertising, journalism, public relations, or marketing.‖26 
Field Manual 33-1-1, dated 1994, gives better instructions on how to craft a 
message.  The field manual states, ―PSYOP messages come in many forms…whatever 
the kind of message, however, they have a common characteristic—they ultimately have 
the same kind of purpose and the same need to be attended, understood, accepted, and 
acted upon.‖27  Appendix J of the same manual goes on to explain, ―the copy text is the 
written message…it contains a detailed discussion of the appeal being made, supporting 
and justifying it.  A good text convinces the reader that only by accepting the course of 
action stated or implied in the text can his needs be fulfilled.  The text must contain 
terms, phrases, and vernacular familiar to the target audience.‖28  Just as with print 
products, current doctrine has left out key information that the PSYOP planner needs to 
write a message inside a script for an audio product, such as a loudspeaker or radio 
broadcast.  FM 33-1-1 addresses these issues by listing a number of principles and factors 
that the PSYOP planner should follow in order to properly script a message that would be 
used in radio and loudspeaker operations. 
                                                 
26  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations 
Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, August 2007, 4–17. 
27  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 33-1-1: Psychological Operations 
Techniques and Procedures, May 1994, 7-3. 
28  Ibid., J-2. 
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The third variable is the medium.  During Phase II, the best medium is selected, 
and during Step Six, determining accessibility, the ―PSYOP Soldiers determine which 
media can reach the TA and to what degree the TA can be influenced by each media 
type.‖29  There are a number of tasks that the PSYOP planner completes in order to 
choose the best medium.  These tasks include:   
deciding how the TA currently receives information, deciphering current 
media patterns and usage, determining how the TA uses the medium, 
discovering how involved the TA is in the process, understanding whether 
the TA assesses the media individually or with others, debating what new 
media can be used to access the TA, including all of the information on 
the target audience analysis worksheet (TAAW), and articulating the 
technical aspects of each media. Once these tasks are complete, they will 
help answer the question, ‗What types of media will effectively carry [the] 
PSYOP [message] to the TA?‘30 
The fourth variable is receptiveness of the TA.   Current doctrine discusses 
susceptibility of the TA but fails to address TA receptiveness.  During phase II of the 
seven-phase PSYOP process, the PSYOP planner implements the Target Audience 
Analysis Model (TAAM).  The TAAM ―is a practical research and analysis method that 
yields the necessary information for developing PSYOP products and actions.‖31  
Determining TA receptiveness is not identified in any of the seven steps.  If the TA is 
receptive, then they are ready or willing to receive favorably or open to arguments, ideas, 
or change.  For the TA to be influenced by the PSYOP message, they first need to be 
receptive of the message. 
C. EVOLUTION OF PSYOP 
Since World War I, the act of using media to send a message to a target audience 
has evolved through a number of names and definitions, and by those who practice it.  
―Propaganda‖ was the first term that people on all sides of the war used, meaning any 
                                                 
29  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations 
Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, August 2007, 2-21. 
30  Ibid., 2-21. 
31  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations 
Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, August 2007, 2-3. 
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form of communication which affected the minds, emotions, and actions of a particular 
group.32  Military propaganda, defined by Paul Linebarger as ―the planned use of any 
form of communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given enemy, 
neutral or friendly foreign group for a specific strategic or tactical purpose,‖33 was used 
extensively by all sides during the war. In the United States, several agencies were 
responsible for the employment of propaganda throughout the First World War, which 
included the Committee on Public Information (CPI), better known as the ―Creel 
Committee‖ and the military Propaganda Section inside the General Headquarters, 
American Expeditionary Forces.34 
After World War I, the United States lost most of its interest in the use of 
propaganda because many believed that its employment was not necessary in a peace 
times.  The Army disbanded both the CPI and the military Propaganda Section and 
almost all of the experiences and lessons learned during the war were lost over the next 
twenty years.  In 1920, J.F.C. Fuller analyzed the lessons learned from the employment 
of new weapons in the war.  He prophesied that, in the future, traditional warfare fought 
on the battlefield would be replaced by a ―purely psychological warfare.‖ 35  The term 
psychological warfare (PSYWAR) would come into play when the United States went to 
war against Germany and Japan during the Second World War (WWII).  This change, 
from propaganda to PSYWAR, was the result of a translated German document that 
claimed ―psychology should be employed in all phases of combat.‖36 However, during 
this time, both propaganda and PSYWAR were used interchangeably. 
Just as in WWI, when WWII broke out the United States did not have a unit 
dedicated to conducting PSYWAR.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to correct 
                                                 
32 Paul M.A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, 2
nd
 ed. (New York:  Duell, Sloan, and Pearce:  
1954), 39. 
33 Ibid., 39. 
34 Ibid., 67. 
35 J.F.C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War (London:  1920), 320, quoted in W.E. Daugherty, ―Origins of 
PSYOP Terminology,‖ Daugherty, ed., The Art and Science of Psychological Operations:  Case Studies in 
Military Application, 1 (Department of the Army, Washington:  April 1976) 18-19. 
36 Alfred H. Paddock, ―Legitimizing Army Psychological Operations,‖ Joint Forces Quarterly 56 (1st 
quarter 2010): 90. 
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the problem by appointing Colonel William Donavon as the Coordinator of Information 
(COI) in 1941.  Over the next four years, the control of PSYWAR would be wrestled 
between a number of civilian and military agencies.  The COI, later renamed the Office 
of Strategic Studies (OSS), disbanded the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) within 
the Military Intelligence Service at the end of 1942; ten months later, the PWB was 
resurrected as the Propaganda Branch within the Military Intelligence Division (G-2). 
The Office of War Information (OWI), and a number of other agencies fought back and 
forth for the rights to conduct PSYWAR throughout WWII.37  In 1944, the Psychological 
Warfare Branch was established in General MacArthur‘s Southwest Pacific Area 
Command and the Psychological Warfare Division was established in General 
Eisenhower‘s Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.38  It was not until 
1945 that all the agencies involved would finally be integrated in some way or another to 
practice PSYWAR.  Military historian Stanly Sandler argues: 
The military relationship had been clarified.  The new [Propaganda 
Branch] undertook no operations whatever, but connected War 
Department with OWI and OSS for policy and liaison…military needs in 
psychological warfare had been settled by regarding the Theaters in this 
respect as autonomous, and leaving to the respective Theater Commanders 
the definition of their relationships with OWI and OSS, and their use of 
each.39 
Throughout World War II, PSYWAR had a difficult time in establishing itself 
within an appropriate agency, either civilian or military. The military finally decided to 
place the capabilities of PSYWAR within the newly established Propaganda Branch in 
the G-2.  Although short lived (only four years) the Propaganda Branch was finally taken 
out of the G-2 branch in 1946 and, in early 1947, moved to Plans and Operations under 
the G-3.  During this same period, Major General M.S. Eddy, who was the chief of 
                                                 
37 Paul M.A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, 2
nd
 ed. (New York:  Duell, Sloan, and Pearce:  1954) 
89–96. 
38   Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 
2002), 3-18.    
39  Stanley Sandler, “Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You!”: A History of U.S. Army Combat 
Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical 
Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 42–46. 
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information, raised concerns over the term psychological warfare and that it would have 
to be carefully defined ―so as not to arouse public indignation or fear of ‗gestapo-ism‘ 
and authoritarianism in our own country.‖40  Military historian Paul Paddock argues:  
Director of Plans and Operations was overall responsible for the general 
supervision of Army psychological warfare activities…[but] several War 
Department agencies were given pieces of the pie… Real centralization of 
psychological warfare activities did not occur until January 1951 with the 
formation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), 
headed by General McClure.41    
According to OCPW‘s mission, ―it was to formulate and develop psychological 
and special operations plan for the Army.‖42  One of the major divisions that McClure 
organized his office into was Psychological Operations.  The name of the division would 
later help in transitioning the term PSYWAR to Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in 
the 1960s. 
When North Korea attacked South Korea in the summer of 1950, the only active 
duty unit that focused on PSYWAR was a small Army detachment based at Fort Riley, 
Kansas.  This detachment, later designated as the 1
st
 Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) 
Company, was sent to Korea in the fall of 1950.  Once again, interest in PSYWAR 
increased within the U.S. government and the Army in response to this new conflict.  In 
1951, with the need for increased PSYWAR capabilities, the 1
st
 Radio Broadcasting and 
Leaflet (RB&L) Group was organized and sent to Korea to help support strategic 
propaganda activities.  Throughout the war, the 1
st
 L&L Company conducted PSYWAR 
using mobile loudspeakers and the 1
st
 RB&L group conducted PSYWAR using print 
media and radio stations.  Even though PSYWAR capabilities increased during the war, 
once again, at the end of the war and over the next ten years, these capabilities were 
greatly degraded.   Despite this, General McClure was able to establish the Psychological 
Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in May 1952, which is most likely why 
                                                 
40  Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 
2002), 48.    
41  Ibid., 45.    
42  Ibid., 95.    
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PSYWAR capabilities did not disappear altogether.  Because the Warfare Center trained 
both PSYWAR and Special Forces units, the name was later changed to the Special 
Warfare Center in 1956. 
In early 1960, the term that represented the act of sending messages using various 
types of media changed once again.  According to Paddock,  
Psychological operations replaced psychological warfare…Psychological 
operations, or PSYOP, encompassed psychological warfare, but the latter 
indicated propaganda directed only against enemy forces and populations 
for divisive purposes.  The new and broader term could also be used to 
describe propaganda employed toward friendly and neutral audiences for 
cohesive purposes.43   
Recognizing the need for PSYOP capabilities in Vietnam, the 6
th
 PSYOP 
Battalion was activated in country in 1965.  Two years later, the size of U.S. Army 
PSYOP had increased to a group, identified as the 4
th
 PSYOP Group, which consisted of 
four PSYOP battalions.  Once again, having limited and degraded PSYOP capabilities 
before the war started, the Army spent time during the war to build up and employ the 
capabilities that were needed.  By the end of the war in Vietnam, the U.S. Army had a 
robust PSYOP capability able to conduct PSYOP at the tactical and strategic levels.  This 
all changed after the war as the U.S. government began to draw down the military.  By 
1974, the only active duty unit that was capable of conducing effective PSYOP was the 
4
th
 PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg, but it was understaffed and poorly equipped.  The term 
―psychological operations‖ took hold during this period and would be used for the next 
30 years. 
From 1974 to the mid-1980s, PSYOP forces managed to survive at Fort Bragg.  In 
the mid to late 1980s, PSYOP forces were increased in size and the equipment that they 
used was modernized.  This was the first time such actions took place when the U.S. was 
not at war.  New interests in PSYOP began to rise and, according to Colonel Curtis Boyd, 
there were a number of things that helped in the growth of PSYOP.  Colonel Boyd states, 
                                                 
43  Alfred H. Paddock, ―Legitimizing Army Psychological Operations,‖ Joint Forces Quarterly 56 (1st 
quarter 2010): 91. 
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The impact of President Ronald Reagan‘s National Security Decision 
Directive 77 (1983), the Department of Defense PSYOP Master Plan 
(1985) and the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1987) provided permanent PSYOP 
staff authorizations within the Joint Staff, the Department of the Army and 
the U.S. Special Operations Command as well as the permanent 
establishment of two reserve-component PSYOP Groups, an enlisted 
military occupational specialty (37F), [and] the recognition of the 
importance of PSYOP planning at Combat Commands.44  
During the next 30 years, PSYOP forces were used extensively throughout the 
world supporting missions that expanded across the spectrum of conflicts. 
Operation Enduring Freedom, the War on Terror, and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
presented new challenges for the PSYOP community.  With PSYOP forces constantly 
being deployed to support these operations, the need to increase the size of the 
community grew every day.  In 2006, the PSYOP Branch was created and an 
authorization to increase the number of soldiers and officers within the 4
th
 PSYOP was 
given. 
Another challenge to the community in the post-September 11 security world was 
the term PSYOP.  Since the origins of PSYOP came from a long history of 
misunderstandings and name changes, individuals in the government and the Army saw 
the need to hide what they were doing by calling it different names.  Military Support to 
Public Diplomacy, International Public Diplomacy, and even Information Operations 
have been used to soften the reputation that the term PSYOP gives.45  After years of 
mistrust, misunderstandings, and misuse, a new ―softer‖ term was needed to cover all that 
PSYOP does and to help employ PSYOP not only in the tactical and strategic area, but 
also in the political realm.  Military Information Support Operations, or MISO, took the 
place of PSYOP in 2010 and transition to this new term began in 2011.  For the purpose 
of this thesis, the term Psychological Operations will be used because it is well known 
and has a longer history than Military Information Support Operations. 
                                                 
44  Colonel Curtis Boyd, ―The Future of MISO,‖ Special Warfare 24 (2010): 24. 
45  Colonel Curtis Boyd, ―The Future of MISO,‖ Special Warfare 24 (2010): 25. 
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D. FUTURE 
Currently, the state of PSYOP is in flux. Doctrine is being rewritten to cover how 
to plan and execute PSYOP effectively, but before this can be done, the PSYOP 
community must learn what makes for successful PSYOP.  The community can learn this 
by looking into the past and by considering communication theory. 
The Korean War is a great case to study to find out how to construct, execute, and 
measure successful PSYOP because there was a standing unit, although small, that was 
ready to conduct PSYOP when the war began.  Also, PSYOP was conducted by all sides 
in the war and we have had a long time, over fifty years, to analyze the outcomes.  There 
is a lot of information about loudspeaker operations and leaflet drops that were conducted 
during the Korean War which can be analyzed to find out what made them successful or 
unsuccessful.  One well known case, Operation Moolah, provides excellent information 
on the effects, or lack thereof, of a leaflet drop that offered a reward for a North Korean 
pilot to defect with a Soviet MIG. 
Even though the name of PSYOP has changed over the last one hundred years and 
the job to plan and execute PSYOP has moved from one organization to another, the 
―act‖ has always stayed the same—sending messages using various types of media to 
change the behavior of a targeted audience.  The next chapter will use communication 
theory to analyze the process in which a sender sends a message to a receiver.  In this 
case, the sender is the PSYOP organization, the message is the PSYOP message intended 
to change the behavior of the TA, and the receiver is the TA. 
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III. COMMUNICATION THEORY 
Measuring PSYOP effectiveness has always been a difficult task.  Military 
historian Stephen E. Pease argues, ―Judging the effectiveness of a PSYWAR operation is 
almost impossible…There usually is no immediate and observable link between the cause 
(the PSYWAR) and effect.‖46  Most of the information on PSYOP‘s use during conflict 
has focuses on measures of performance (MOP) rather than measures of effectiveness 
(MOE).  MOP such as the number of leaflets dropped, the number of hours of radio 
broadcasts are made, and the amount of money spent on operations are almost always 
reported.  Rarely is the actual effectiveness of these leaflets, radio broadcasts, and money 
spent reported in an appropriate time to measure the success of the PSYOP operation.  
The tendency to report MOP and not MOE is the result of a number of factors.  First, 
commanders typically want to know the immediate results of PSYOP.  The problem with 
this demand is that almost all PSYOP aims to change the behavior of a TA, which takes 
time.  There are a few instances where the effectiveness of PSYOP can be measured 
fairly quickly, such as a surrender appeal to enemy troops.  Effectiveness can be easily 
measured by the number of enemy surrenders. However, immediate results are the 
exception, not the norm in PSYOP.  Second, in order to prove that they are participating 
in the operation, PSYOP planners usually report MOP.  Because measuring the effects of 
the PSYOP product takes time and commanders want results now, MOP is easily 
substituted in place of MOE to give the commander something. 
To alleviate the temptation of substituting MOP with MOE, PSYOP planners 
need to provide the commander with a pre-measurement of the effectiveness of the 
PSYOP product that will be deployed.  This premeasurement can be achieved by using a 
Communication Theory model in the seven-phase PSYOP process.  As an evaluation 
tool, the model can provide the PSYOP planner with insights on what makes for 
successful PSYOP.  The model can also be used as a lens for analyzing PSYOP that has 
already been conducted to find out what made the PSYOP successful or unsuccessful. 
                                                 
46 Stephen E. Pease, PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953 (Harrisburg: Stackpole 
Books, 1992), 12. 
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This chapter offers a brief history of Communication Theory models. It then 
builds off of these models to construct a new communication model as an evaluation tool 
for PSYOP planning. This model will then be used as an analytical tool to evaluate past 
PSYOP, specifically PSYOP during the Korean War. 
A. HISTORY OF COMMUNICATION THEORY MODELS 
Communications have been taking place for thousands of years.  Just as the 
interest in PSYOP increased over the last century, interest in how and why individuals 
communicate has too.  The interest in communication has allowed individuals to create a 
number of models which describe how communication takes place.  At its simplest form, 
a communication model has three elements:  the sender, a message, and the receiver.  
Throughout the 20th century, political scientists, mathematicians, and communications 
theorists helped developed the communication models that we use today.  Prior to the 
20th century, one of the first individuals who discussed the importance of communication 
was Aristotle.  Aristotle, writing in 350 B.C.E., defined the study of communication as 
―rhetoric‖ and described three parts that make up the process of communication.  He 
explained, ―Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners 
to speeches.  For of the three elements in speech-making—speaker, subject, and person 
addressed—it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speeches end and object.‖47  
During his time, Aristotle already recognized the importance of the target audience while 
communicating.  Aristotle‘s definition can be described as the first communications 
model in which the speaker is the sender, the subject is the message, and the person 
addressed is the receiver. 
Throughout the 20th century, with the increase of interest in communications, a 
number of individuals are attributed with laying the foundation of communication theory.  
A few of these individuals, Harold Lasswell, Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, 
Wilbur Schramm, and David K. Berlo, developed fairly simple models that show how 
communication takes place.   
                                                 
47 W. Rhys Roberts (trans), ―Rhetorica,‖ The Works of Aristotle, volume XI, ed., W.D. Ross (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1924), 1348. 
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Harold D. Lasswell, writing in the first half of the 20th century, developed the 
model that states, ―Who says what in which channel to whom with what effect.‖48  
Lasswell expands on Aristotle‘s definition by adding an additional part to his model.  
This part, the channel, can be described today as the medium.  This four part model is 
still being used today to describe how communication works. 
 
Figure 1.   Lasswell Model 
In 1948, while working for Bell Telephone Labs, Claude Shannon published a 
paper titled ―A Mathematical Theory of Communication.‖  In the paper, Shannon 
describes a communication system as having six parts: source, message, 
transmitter/encoder, channel, receiver/decoder, and destination.49  As a research 
mathematician, Shannon created this theory in order to help with the information flow 
over telephone lines.  In 1949, Warren Weaver expanded on Shannon‘s writing and 
published a paper titled ―Recent Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of 
Communication.‖   With the information presented in their two papers, Shannon and 
Weaver later published a book titled The Mathematical Theory of Communication.  Both 
men are credited with what is now identified as the Shannon-Weaver Model of 
Communication.  This model introduces noise into the communication process.  Noise, as 
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Weaver states, ―may be distortions of sound (in telephony, for example) or static (in 
radio), or distortions in shape or shading of picture (television), or errors in transmission 
(telegraphy or facsimile), etc.‖50 
 
Figure 2.   Shannon-Weaver Model 
Wilbur Schramm, a communication theorist, wrote a number of books and articles 
about communication throughout the 20th century.  The contributions that Schramm 
made in the field of communications were paramount.  In ―Wilbur Schramm: Portrait of a 
Development Communication Pioneer,‖ Arvind Singhal states, ―Without Wilbur 
Schramm, communication science could never have achieved its present status.  Perhaps 
he should be considered a fifth founder of communication research.‖51 In his book The 
Process and Effects of Mass Communication, Schramm introduced a model that had the 
same elements that Aristotle identified in his definition of Rhetoric, the source or 
speaker, the message or subject, and the destination or person being addressed. Unlike 
Aristotle, Schramm identifies that there needs to be something in common between the 
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source and the destination for the communication to be effective.  This is identified as the 




Figure 3.   Schramm Model 
In 1960, David K. Berlo, a communication theorists like Wilber Schramm, 
introduced a model of communication called the SMCR model.  SMCR, which stands for 
source, message, channel, receiver, includes a number of factors listed under each 




Figure 4.   Berlo Model 
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B. PSYOP MODEL 
For the purpose of this thesis, Berlo‘s model will be used with elements from the 
Shannon-Weaver model.  Also added are elements from PSYOP doctrine, which will 
allow easy analysis once the information is identified during the seven-phase PSYOP 
process.  This model can be used to analyze a PSYOP operation to find out if it has the 
potential to be successful.  The model can also be used to analyze past PSYOP operations 
to find out what made them successful or unsuccessful. 
 
Figure 5.   PSYOP Model 
C. EVALUATION TOOL 
As a very simple evaluation tool, this PSYOP model can be used to analyze the 
first four phases of the seven-phase PSYOP process to find out if you have the 
ingredients that make for successful PSYOP.  At the end of phase IV, the PSYOP planner 
has enough information to use the PSYOP model.  The source/sender is the PSYOP 
planner that is executing the seven-phase PSYOP process.  The source/sender has to have 
an in-depth knowledge of the TA and their environment.  In order to have an in-depth 
knowledge of the TA and their environment, the PSYOP planner must conduct a 
thorough TAA.  FM 3-05.301 states, ―Accurate and thorough analyses of the TA will 
yield vital information for the PSYOP Soldier.  PSYOP TAA seeks to answer five key 
questions: 
 25 
What TAs will be most effective in accomplishing the SPO? 
What are the reasons for the TA‘s current behavior? 
What are the best means of communication to reach the TA? 
How can the TA be influenced to achieve the desired behavior? 
What are the appropriate criteria by which to assess behavior change?‖52 
The TAAM will provide the information that will be used to develop the PSYOP 
argument.  As stated earlier, the PSYOP argument does not provide the specific message, 
but it does give you the appropriate information that will allow you to craft (encode) an 
effective message.  An issue the PSYOP planner must be aware of while crafting the 
PSYOP message is semantic noise.  Semantic noise occurs when the PSYOP planner uses 
phrases, symbols, language dialects, slangs, etc., in the PSYOP message that the TA does 
not understand.  Once the appropriate PSYOP message is crafted, the best medium that 
was identified during TAA is selected.  If the PSYOP planner conducted a thorough 
TAA, as stated earlier, then the appropriate medium will be identified that will have 
maximum effects on the TA.  If semantic noise was introduced while crafting the 
message, then the TA will not understand the message when they receive (decode) it 
from the medium.  Once the appropriate message is sent, without semantic noise, to the 
TA through the appropriate medium, there are two things that the TA has to be in order to 
receive the message.  They have to be receptive and susceptible of the message. 
When comparing the model with the information obtained during TAA, the 
PSYOP planner will insert the required data inside the model.  Once inserted, the model 
will give a visual representation of the communication that will take place between the 
PSYOP planner (sender) and the TA (receiver).  In theory, if the PSYOP planner has the 
in-depth knowledge of the TA, he/she will be able to craft the appropriate message, 
without semantic noise, and send it to a receptive and susceptible TA through the 
appropriate medium, and then the behavior of the TA will be changed. 
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D. PSYOP MODEL AS A LENS 
The four variables of PSYOP messaging are present in the PSYOP model.  As a 
lens, the PSYOP model can be used against PSYOP operations that have been conducted 
in the past to evaluate the effectiveness of the operation.  The four variables, in-depth 
knowledge of the TA, message, medium, and receptiveness of the TA can be used to 
measure the outcome of the operation. By inserting the information obtained from the 
operation into the PSYOP model and using the matrix below as a checklist, it can be 
determined what variables are strong or weak and what impact they had on the operation. 
 
Figure 6.   PSYOP Matrix 
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After inserting the information into the model and using the matrix, one will be 
able to measure the validity of each variable in the hopes of finding out what makes for 
successful PSYOP.  For example, for PSYOP to be successful do all four variables have 
to be strong or can you have successful PSYOP when one or more variables are weak.   
The next chapter will use the PSYOP model and PSYOP matrix as a lens to 
analyze PSYOP operations during the Korean War.  The analysis will focus on one case, 
Operation Moolah, and two areas where the enemy was targeted for surrender, the use of 
the safe conduct pass leaflets and the use of loudspeaker surrender appeals. 
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IV. KOREAN WAR 
This chapter uses the PSYOP model and matrix introduced in chapter three to 
analyze U.S. Psychological Operations during the 1950–1953 Korean War. In particular, 
the chapter investigates three operations from the Korean War: Operation Moolah, which 
aimed to acquire a Russian MiG-15 jet fighter from enemy forces; the use of leaflets that 
carried the safe conduct pass message; and the use of loudspeakers directed toward 
enemy forces, which aimed to reduce morale and persuade combatants to surrender. 
The Korean War was chosen for several reasons.  It was the first time in which 
there was a standing PSYOP unit ready to deploy when the war started.  According to 
military historian Stephen Pease, ―When the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel in 
June 1950, the only operational PSYWAR unit was the small twenty-person Tactical 
Information Detachment at Fort Riley, Kansas.  It was expanded and sent to South Korea 
as the 1
st
 Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1
st
 L&L), arriving on 8 November 1950.‖53 
Also, there was a Psychological Warfare Section, within the Far East Command, that was 
able to produce and disseminate leaflets within twenty-four hours after President Truman 
committed U.S. troops to Korea.54  By having a PSYWAR section in the Far East 
Command and a standing unit ready to deploy, the Army did not lose any valuable time 
in training or planning in PSYWAR for the Korean War.  Second, there have been 
multiple reports and books written on the outcomes of PSYOP conducted during the war.  
This data provides the necessary information to which the PSYOP model and matrix can 
be applied to better understand the successes and failures of PSYOP products and 
methods of messaging during the war.  Finally, despite the fact that the PSYOP model 
and matrix were constructed using current doctrine, it is argued that the matrix and model 
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are useful tools for analyzing past and present PSYOP products and means of messaging; 
it is therefore the purpose of this chapter to test the overall utility of the model and 
matrix. 
Overall, analysis based on the PSYOP model and matrix suggests that the four 
variables identified for PSYOP messaging were not always strong during the three cases 
investigated.  Despite this, successful PSYOP did occur when three of the four were 
strong.  In the use of safe conduct pass leaflets, three strong variables (message, medium, 
and receptiveness of the TA) and one weak variable (in-depth knowledge of the TA) 
resulted in successful PSYOP.  In another case, Operation Moolah, all four variables 
were considered weak, causing PSYOP to be unsuccessful, although the operation was 
considered a success due to secondary effects.  In the last case, loudspeaker surrender 
appeals, two strong variables (message and medium) and two weak variables (in-depth 
knowledge of the TA and Receptiveness of the TA) accounted for PSYOP to be 
successful a majority of the time. 
A. CASE STUDIES:  OPERATION MOOLAH, SAFE CONDUCT PASS 
LEAFLET, AND LOUDSPEAKER SURRENDER APPEAL 
During the Korean conflict, PSYOP planners had to rely on the August 1949 
Field Manual 33-5, Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations to plan and execute 
their operations.  The main focus of the manual was to lower the morale of enemy forces 
and to persuade them to surrender or desert.  Field Manual 33-5 states: ―Psychological 
warfare consists of activities, other than combat, which communicate ideas and 
information intended to affect the minds, emotions, and actions of the enemy…for the 
purpose of reducing the enemy morale and will to fight.‖55  It further states that, ―the 
basic aim of psychological warfare conducted by a military command is to assist in 
expediting the defeat of the armed forces of the enemy.  It achieves this basic purpose by 
seeking to:  Decrease the combat efficiency of the enemy by lowering the morale of his 
forces; Induce enemy forces to surrender or desert; [and] Sustain the morale of friendly 
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elements in enemy areas.‖56  Therefore, PSYOP operations conducted during the Korean 
War dealt mainly with lowering of morale and surrendering of enemy forces. 
1. Operation Moolah 
Operation Moolah was an attempt by U.S. forces in Korea to acquire a Russian 
MiG-15 jet fighter from enemy forces.  The U.S. offered $100,000 to the first pilot who 
defected to South Korea with a combat-capable MiG-15.57 
In the fall of 1950, UN air forces were at a disadvantage when it came to air 
combat.  The Russian MiG-15 jet fighter wreaked havoc in the skies over Korea and the 
UN did not have fighters that could match the power and speed that the MiG-15 brought 
to a dogfight.  The U.S. military needed to study a fully operational MiG-15, fitted for 
combat, in order to understand how the MiG-15 was designed, its capabilities, and how to 
fight effectively against it in the air. The U.S. government also wanted to prove that the 
Soviet Union was actively contributing to the Korean conflict. The Soviet Union claimed 
it was neutral; however, UN pilots reported hearing Russian being spoken over their radio 
frequencies and UN POWs claimed that Soviet pilots interrogated them while in 
captivity.58  The U.S. government, therefore, wanted to prove that the Soviet Union was 
not only supplying the MiG-15 to North Korean forces, but that it was also providing 
Soviet pilots to fly the MiG-15 in combat.  Ultimately, the operation was aimed at 
encouraging either a Russian or North Korean pilot to defect with a combat capable MiG-
15 jet fighter. 
Several stories persist on the origins of the operation, but according to retired 
SGM Herbert Friedman, Edward Hymoff was the one who came up with the idea of 
offering $100,000 to an enemy defector for a combat-ready MiG-15.59 In the fall of 1952, 
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Hymoff, who was the Bureau Chief of the International News Service in Korean, 
presented the concept of a reward for a MiG-15 to General Mark W. Clark while on a 
flight to Tokyo.60  From there, the idea made its way to Washington and the Pentagon 
―authorized [General] Clark to offer a reward for a North Korean Air Force jet fighter.‖61 
Although many consider Operation Moolah as the ―greatest PSYWAR triumph in 
the Korean War,‖62 it can be argued that it actually was not a success because it did not 
achieve its goal—the defection of an enemy pilot with a combat-capable MiG-15.  Two 
months after the armistice was signed, in 1953, a North Korean pilot defected and the 
United States got its hands on a MiG-15, but this defection happened independent of 
Operation Moolah.  The pilot claimed he did not see any of the leaflets dropped or hear 
any of the radio broadcasts connected with the operation. 
However, despite the inability of Operation Moolah to successfully encourage an 
enemy defector with his MiG-15, there were important secondary effects that U.S. 
PSYWAR soldiers observed after the operation began. Pease argues that ―The Russian-
language broadcasts were blocked by a powerful jammer in North Korea… [And] MIG 
flights dropped drastically.  For eight days, there were no MIG sorties at all, an 
unprecedented stand down.‖63 U.S. troops also noted that, following Operation Moolah, 
―the quality of the MIG pilots was noticeably poorer after regular sorties resumed…the 
MIG pilots compiled the worst record of the entire war.  UN Sabres downed 165 MIGs to 
only three losses, a fifty-five-to-one ratio!‖64  Military Intelligence believed that the 
Soviet pilots were no longer flying the MiGs and that the ―Koreans were only letting the 
most politically trustworthy pilots fly, which may have kept their best pilots on the 
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ground,‖65  In other words, even though Operation Moolah did not succeed in persuading 
an enemy pilot to defect with a MiG-15 jet fighter, the operation did have an unintended, 
measurable effect on air operations. 
Operation Moolah consisted of radio broadcasts and leaflet drops in the Korean, 
Chinese, and Russian languages.  U.S. forces dropped over a million leaflets over North 
Korea and radio broadcasts transmitted approved scripts on two separate occasions in 
April and May 1953. 
a. Analysis of Operation Moolah 
The PSYOP model produces the following analysis: 
1. In-depth knowledge of the TA:  The source of the leaflets and radio 
broadcasts was Headquarters, 1
st
 Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group.66  The 1
st
 Radio 
Broadcasting & Leaflet Group arrived in Tokyo in August 1951 to help the Far East 
Command‘s Psychological Warfare Section in its job to wage PSYWAR in Korea.  The 
1
st
 RB&L Group was largely manned by reserve officers with backgrounds in journalism, 
newspaper printing, novel and script writing, artwork, and radio technology.  Even 
though the training that these officers received on Korean customs, language, and social 
details did not provide them with the in-depth knowledge of the TA that they needed, 
Korean nationals helped the officers in developing and targeting and, within a year, the 
Group was able to produce leaflets in sixteen languages and dialects.67  
Two years prior to Operation Moolah, in 1951, George Pettee, a research 
analysts working in the Operations Research Office at The John Hopkins University, 
wrote a technical memorandum titled ―US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War,‖ in 
which he made the following observation: 
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Research for psywar, to provide summary data on enemy culture, morale, 
issues, idiom, personalities, etcetera, has barely been initiated.  The large 
volume of bulk intelligence and basic reference materials available, 
containing pertinent information and data, makes research a requirement 
for any large scale psywar program.68 
Overall, the 1
st
 Radio & Leaflet Group did not have the in-depth 
knowledge necessary of the Chinese, Russian and North Korean TAs.  For example, in a 
conversation between Lieutenant No Kum-Sok, the North Korean pilot who defected 
with the MiG-15, and retired SGM Herbert Friedman, Lieutenant No stated, ―We had no 
concept of the value of the dollar…My salary was 500,000 Chinese Won per month, 
which was worth about $50 in U.S. currency…I was absolutely ignorant of what could be 
purchased with $100,000 then.‖69 In other words, the offering of $100,000 did not mean 
anything to the North Korean pilots. 
The incomprehension of the true worth of the $100,000 reward created 
―semantic noise.‖  Semantic noise, identified in Chapter III, occurs when the PSYOP 
planner uses phrases, symbols, language dialects, slangs, etc., in the PSYOP message that 
the TA does not understand.  In this case, the ignorance of the value of American dollars 
by the North Korean pilots caused the message to be weak and misunderstood. 
2. Message:  There were three variations of the Operation Moolah leaflet 
that was dropped.  Each leaflet was written in the Russian, Chinese, and Korean 
languages.  The main text of the leaflet reads as follows: 
To:  Brave Pilots of Jet Aircraft 
Subject:  A Road to Freedom 
Pilots!  The Far East Command offers its help to all brave pilots who wish 
to free themselves from the vicious whip of the Communist regime and 
start a new and better life, with proper honor in the Free World. 
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The Far East Command offers you refuge, protection, human care and 
attention.  You are given full guarantee that your names will remain secret 
if you do desire.  Pilots!  Your brave move will bring you to freedom and 
will give you opportunity to live in the future without fear for your well-
being.  Besides that, your heroism and decision will help others by 
pointing to them the road to freedom. 
The Far East Command will reward $50,000 United States dollars to any 
pilot who delivers a modern, operational, combat-type jet aircraft in 
flyable condition to South Korea.  The first pilot who delivers such a jet 
aircraft to the Free World will receive a bonus of an additional 50,000 US 
dollars for his bravery. 
Following is a list of instructions to all pilots who desire to free 
themselves from the Communist yoke.  Escapee pilots will fly to 
Paengyong-do Island, fifty (50) kilometers south of Chodo Island.  From 
Paengyong-do escapee pilots will proceed to Kimpo Air Base at 6100 
meters altitude, descend over Kimpo Air Base, and proceed to make an 
immediate landing.  UN Aircraft will accompany escapee remaining 
always above and behind, unless low clouds or visibility prevent escapee 
from locating Kimpo Airbase.  If escapee is unable to make a visual let-
down, he will proceed to the Seoul area at 6100 meters and circle with his 
gear down.  A United States aircraft will then fly close abreast and lead 
the way to the landing field.  Upon initial contact with UN Aircraft, or if at 
any time UN Aircraft attempts attack, escapee will immediately lower 
landing gear and rock wings violently. 
The Free World shall welcome you as an old friend as well as a hero. 
Mark W. Clark 
General, United States Army Commander-in-Chief 
Far East Command70 
All three messages were almost exactly alike. The back of the Chinese and 
Korean language leaflets had an additional message that read: ―This is a message from 
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the Americans to any jet pilot who reads Russian.  If you know such a person, please give 
it to him.  It tells him how to escape to the UN Forces.‖71 
Using the PSYOP model as an analytical tool, we can further identify 
mistakes that were made when the message was crafted.  In addition to the meaningless 
sum of money offered, the instructions given to potential defectors were also culturally 
inappropriate and introduced semantic noise.  Critiquing the instructions on the leaflet, 
LT No stated the following: 
During the last 90 days of the war, MiGs seldom flew to North Korea.  
Chodo is 100km (62 miles) southwest of Pyongyang in the Yellow Sea.  
To fly to Chodo would be all but fatal at that time.  Moreover, flying from 
Chodo to Paengyong-do, 50 km (31 miles) over the sea does not make any 
sense.  Nobody had ever heard of Paengyong-do in the Yellow Sea.  
Finally, proceed from Paengyong-do to Kimpo, 200 km (124 miles) at 
6100 meter (20,000 feet) altitude.  Any MiG following the above flight 
path for defection would have been an easy prey for the Sabre jets.72 
In other words, the instructions given to the pilot did not make any sense.  
Although the source of the message perhaps could not have known that North Korean 
pilots had not heard of Paengyong-do, they should have known that at the altitude they 
gave, 20,000 feet, MiGs would be easily attacked and possibly shot out of the sky by 
Sabre jets. 
3. Channel/Medium:  Leaflets and radios were the medium of choice for 
this operation.  Millions of leaflets and fourteen radio stations carried the message to the 
TA.73  As with the message, several problems occurred because of the medium.  The 
leaflets were not dropped in the right place. Furthermore, the TA did not have access to a 
radio in order to listen to the broadcasts.  According to Lieutenant No, ―When the two B-
29s dropped those million Moolah leaflets along the Yalu River, my MiG-15 Squadron 
was stationed in Tunghua Air Base, about 50 miles north of Manpo on the Yalu River.  
The Americans dropped no leaflets there and we had no radio.  I do not believe any North 
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Korean pilots saw the leaflet.  Our unit had returned to the Dandong airbase in early July 
1953.  All the MiG-15s flew to combat from China most of the time.‖74  This statement 
clearly shows that both mediums were ineffective in reaching their TA. 
4. Receiver/TA:  The intended TA was any pilot who flew a MiG-15.  
Ideally, the United States wanted a Soviet pilot, but a Chinese or Korean pilot would do.  
In order to persuade a communist pilot to defect to the West, the receiver would have to 
first be receptive to the message.  The message and the medium are both important for 
influencing TA receptivity, specifically both needs to be credible in order for the TA to 
be open to the idea of defecting.  In order to produce receptiveness, the message should 
have included something that the pilot wanted and understood.  LT No stated, ―The 
defecting pilot had to be an anti-Communist who wanted political asylum in the United 
States. Therefore, a statement in the leaflet of guaranteeing freedom and a job in America 
after defection would have been more effective.‖75 In the case of LT No, the defector was 
not receptive to the idea of defecting for a cash payment, freedom and political asylum 
would have been more effective incentives.  
b. Operation Moolah PSYOP Matrix 
Using the PSYOP model and matrix to analyze Operation Moolah yields 
the following findings.  In this case, all four variables—in-depth knowledge of the TA, 
the message, the medium, and the receptiveness of the TA—are considered weak.  Since 
the overall intent of the operation was to acquire a combat-capable MiG-15 by a 
defecting pilot, and it did not do this, it can be argued that the operation was 
unsuccessful. 
However, the operation had positive secondary effects that allowed the 
PSYOP planners to come to the conclusion that the operation was successful.  Since these 
secondary effects—the drop in sorties and the increase of MiG-15 shoot downs—were 
not the original intent of the operation, they cannot be used to measure the success or 
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effectiveness of the operation.  Even though Operation Moolah was considered the most 
effective PSYWAR campaign in the Korean War, it had little by way of in-depth 
knowledge of the TA, messaging, the mediums chosen, and creating receptiveness in its 
TA, in addition to failing to acquire a combat-capable MiG-15. The findings are 
summarized in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7.   PSYOP Matrix (Operation Moolah) 
2. Safe Conduct Pass Leaflets 
During the war in Korea, U.S. forces used leaflets, loudspeakers, and radios 
extensively to carry the PSYOP messages to civilians, friendly forces,76 and enemy 
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troops.   The most preferred method, leaflets, were dropped by aircraft, delivered by 
artillery and, on rare occasions, patrols left leaflets ―in the most-traveled areas behind the 
enemy lines.‖77  Because leaflets dropped from aircraft would be scattered over a large 
area, ―the 105mm howitzer remained the principal artillery piece for placing propaganda-
loaded shells on pinpoint targets.‖78 Over the course of the war, hundreds of millions of 
leaflets were scattered across the Korean peninsula.  These leaflets, described as ―printed 
advertisements‖ by military historian Stephen Pease, varied in size with the smallest 
measuring 3 by 5 inches to the largest being the size of a newspaper.79 
The first leaflet dropped occurred less than twenty-four hours after ―President 
Harry Truman announced that U.S. troops, supporting United Nations decisions, would 
come to the assistance of the invaded Republic of South Korea.‖80  This leaflet targeted 
South Korean troops and civilians; it was very basic in design and informed the troops 
and civilians that help was on the way and to stand firm.81  Weeks later, the first leaflet 
targeting enemy troops was dropped.  For the remainder of the war, more than one 
hundred types of leaflets were dropped that were focused on three major military 
objectives:  weakening the effectiveness and resistance of the North Korean (and, later, 
the Communist Chinese) People‘s Army; bringing the truth about the war to the people of 
North Korea; and bolstering the morale of the South Korean troops and civilian 
population.82 
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The safe conduct pass, which aimed to weaken the effectiveness and resistance of 
the North Koreans, would become the most famous leaflet used during the war.  The safe 
conduct pass played on the terrible conditions that enemy troops faced, including lack of 
food, shelter, medical supplies, and their freedom.  The leaflet gave instructions for how 
to surrender and promised food and humane treatment for those who defected.83  The Far 
East Command‘s Psychological Warfare Section and the Eighth Army‘s Psychological 
Warfare Division developed several different variations of this message, all encouraging 
enemy surrenders and defections.  However, after learning that ―more than thirty percent 
of the surrendering soldiers were functionally illiterate, able to read only road signs and 
the simplest instructions,‖84 safe conduct passes and surrender leaflets changed and 
included an easy to read map that showed the best way to UN positions. 
Another change to the surrender leaflet occurred when PSYWAR planners 
learned that the black bars they used in photographs to hide the identity of the POW‘s 
picture on the leaflet were being exploited by Communist officers.  ―Communist political 
officers were explaining [to their troops] that the black bars were there to hide the scars 
from disfiguring chemical warfare experiments.‖85 As a result, the black bars were 
removed so the POW‘s picture could be seen and to show that there was nothing wrong 
with them. 
a. Analysis of the Safe Conduct Pass 
The PSYOP model produces the following analysis: 
1. In-depth knowledge:  Just as the previous case study, in-depth 
knowledge of the TA can be considered weak because there was no information on the 
research conducted before developing the safe conduct passes. There is evidence that the 
Eighth Army‘s Psychological Warfare Division lacked the proper resources needed in 
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acquiring the in-depth knowledge of the TA that was needed.  In the technical 
memorandum Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War, it states that: 
EUSAK [Eighth United States Army in Korea] Psywar has little or no 
library…there is actually no library for the division as a whole.  The 
Projects Group does, however, have a small collection of materials and 
books.  These include three Hong-Kong newspapers, Chinese and Soviet 
picture magazines, several books on China and Korea (e.g., Crow‘s Five 
Hundred Million Customers, Osgood‘s Ethnology of Korea), Chinese and 
Korean dictionaries, Army psywar manuals, Linebarger‘s Psychological 
Warfare, a college textbook on psychology and collections of the speeches 
of Mao Tse-tung and Ghu The, as well as official reports of various 
kinds.86  
The strongest evidence that the Far East Command‘s Psychological 
Warfare Section and the Eighth Army‘s Psychological Warfare Division had insufficient 
knowledge of the TA is the fact that they printed elaborate instructions and were unaware 
that a significant portion of the TA was illiterate. Once this was discovered, they made 
improvements to the safe conduct pass and included a map. Furthermore, after the 
Psychological Warfare section learned that the black bars on the leaflet pictures were 
believed to be hiding marks of torture, the black bars were removed so the POW‘s picture 
could be seen and to show that there was nothing wrong with them. 
2. Message:  The Far East Command‘s Psychological Warfare Section and 
the Eighth Army‘s Psychological Warfare Division created several variations of the safe 
conduct pass and each leaflet was written in the Korean, Chinese, and English languages.  
Although each pass varied, they usually carried the same message to the enemy, which 
stated: 
WHEN YOU COME OVER TO THE U.N. FORCES, IT IS 
IMPORTANT TO FOLLOW THESE STEPS. 
1.  Wait for a favorable time to escape from your unit. 
2.  Destroy or bury your weapons. 
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3.  Make your way to the nearest UN forces during daylight hours only. 
4.  Come down an open road in single file, with both hands raised above 
your head. 
5.  Bring your wounded brothers with you.87 
The English portion of the message stated: 
Attention all soldiers of the United Nations Forces.  This leaflet guarantees 
humane treatment to any North Korean desiring to cease fighting.  Take 
this man to your nearest commissioned officer at once.88  
Another leaflet stated: 
1.  This is from the UN, to you soldiers.  If you have a friend you can trust, 
please let him read it, too. 
2.  If you want to escape, try it at night. 
3.  The UN soldiers will warmly welcome you. 
4.  Please come safely and the UN will give you food, a warm place, and 
medical treatment.  You will be happy and welcome.89 
Because the message was basic, easy to read, and had clear instructions, it 
was very effective in informing enemy combatants that could read the best way to 
surrender.  Following the discovery that roughly 30% could not read, the pass provided a 
visual map for the enemy troops to follow.  Semantic noise was not introduced in the 
message, making it clear and easy to understand. 
3. Channel/Medium:  The medium that was chosen to carry the safe 
conduct pass was the leaflet; millions were dropped all over enemy positions.  Because 
enemy troops could be executed for carrying these safe conduct passes, U.S. forces 
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designed many of them to resemble banknotes, which allowed enemy troops to conceal 
the safe conduct pass from their superiors until the time came for them to be used.  The 
leaflets had credibility because they ―carried the signature of the United Nations 
Commander, General Douglas MacArthur or his successor, General Matthew 
Ridgway…the Eighth Army [safe conduct pass] was signed by General James Van 
Fleet.‖90 
4. Receiver/TA:  The intended TA was enemy troops.  Because of the 
conditions that enemy troops faced—lack of food, shelter, medical supplies, and 
freedom—they were receptive to a message offering these things in return for 
surrendering.  In one survey of 750 POWs, the ―prisoners asserted the greatest obstacle to 
surrender was the fear of being killed…The promise of cigarettes and freedom from hard 
labor as well as safety from aerial attack were important to these captives, most of whom 
claimed that they believed the ‗happy POW‘ accounts in many leaflets.‖91  In the 
following list from technical memorandum US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War, 
dated January 1951, the following number of POWs was recorded.   
 
                                                 
90 Carl Berger, ―The Korean Safe-Conducts,‖ The Art and Science of Psychological Operations:  Case 
Studies of Military Application, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1976), 407. 
91 R.C Sheldon and H. Senft, Preliminary Evaluations of Psywar Leaflets and Broadcasts from IPOR 
POW Interrogations (International Public Opinioin Research, Washington:  22 February 1951), cited by 
Stanley Sandler, ―Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You!”: A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological 
Operations (Fort Bragg, NC:  U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 
9, 1999), 212. 
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Figure 8.   Reasons for Surrender92 
Because the PSYWAR column in the table is not further broken down into 
what type of PSYWAR was the cause of their surrender, either by leaflet, loudspeaker, or 
radio, it is hard to tell what percentage of the total number of surrenders were actually 
influenced by a safe conduct pass leaflet. 
b. Safe Conduct Pass PSYOP Matrix 
Using the PSYOP model and matrix t analyze the case yields the 
following conclusions.  In this case, three of the four variables—the message, the 
medium, and the receptiveness of the TA—are considered strong.  One variable, in-depth 
knowledge of the TA, is considered weak. (See Figure 9.) 
Various accounts claim the successfulness of the leaflets in terms of the 
number of enemy troops that surrendered, ―Some estimate that more than 100,000 North 
Korean and Chinese soldiers surrendered as a result of US PSYWAR activities;‖93 
however, there was no distinction between what type of PSYWAR influenced the enemy 
                                                 
92 George S. Pettee, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-3:  US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War 
(Chevy Chase, Maryland:  Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 42. 
93 Stephen E. Pease, PSYWAR:  Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950–1953 (Harrisburg:  Stackpole 
Books, 1992), 37. 
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to surrender and if there were other causes that prompted enemy troops to desert.  It is 
difficult to say with certainty that the safe conduct pass leaflet accounted for a definitive 
amount of enemy surrenders throughout the war, despite the high number of defectors. 
 
 
Figure 9.   PSYOP Matrix (Safe Conduct Pass Leaflet) 
3. Loudspeaker Surrender Appeals 
Loudspeakers were rarely deployed during the early months of the war.  In 
January 1951, seven months after the war started, George Pettee explained in the 
technical memorandum US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War that ―Public address, 




experimental.  Although widely and effectively used by many forces on both sides in 
World War II, there has been little equipment available in Korea, and what has been 
available has been used with little effect.‖94 
The unit responsible for conducting tactical level PSYWAR was the 1
st
 Leaflet & 
Loudspeaker Company.  This unit, which was originally the twenty-person Tactical 
Information Detachment at Fort Riley, Kansas, was expanded, renamed, and sent to 
Korea, arriving in November 1950.95  Within this deployment, the Loudspeaker Platoon 
was pushed down to commanders to be utilized along the front lines.96  Although the 1
st
 
Leaflet & Loudspeaker Company was issued three loudspeakers, which were mounted on 
one-quarter ton trailers, only two of the loudspeakers had arrived in Korea by the end of 
November 1951; of the two that had arrived, only one was working.97  However, over the 
next few months, the 1
st
 Leaflet & Loudspeaker Company increased in size, and early in 
1951, ―there were 12 to 21 [loudspeaker] teams, with four or more usually posted to each 
corps and one per division on the line.‖98 
According to military historian Stanley Sandler, there were a number of 
advantages that loudspeakers had compared to leaflets.  ―[A loudspeaker] was not 
‗wasted‘ like approximately ninety percent of the tens of millions of leaflets produced in 
this war, it had obviously more of an appeal to semi-literate peasants than leaflets, and 
the Korean language (Hangul) seemed more suited to the spoken than to the written 
word.  In addition, enemy cadre could hardly forbid their men to listen, as they could 
                                                 
94 George S. Pettee, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-3:  US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War 
(Chevy Chase, Maryland:  Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 23. 
95 Stephen E. Pease, PSYWAR:  Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953 (Harrisburg:  Stackpole 
Books, 1992), 20. 
96 Ibid., 22. 
97 George S. Pettee, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-3:  US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War 
(Chevy Chase, Maryland:  Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 29. 
98 Stanley Sandler, ―Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You!”: A History of U.S. Army Combat 
Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC:  U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical 
Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 226. 
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prohibit their picking up leaflets.‖99  The message of choice by the loudspeaker teams 
was the surrender appeal.  Because the ―range of the loudspeaker was 1,000 yards to one 
mile,‖100 teams were brought to the front lines to broadcast their appeals to the enemy. 
A May 1951 command report attributed success to the loudspeaker teams, arguing 
that: 
Nine (9) teams operated during the period with all American divisions, 
and with other United Nations forces, conducting a total of forty-eight (48) 
missions…A known total of two thousand nine hundred forty three (2943) 
prisoners surrendered as a direct result of ground loudspeaker broadcasts.  
This is a considerable increase over the preceding period.101 
a. Analysis of Loudspeaker Surrender Appeals 
The PSYOP model produces the following analysis: 
1. In-depth knowledge:  Just as the previous case studies, in-depth 
knowledge of the TA can be considered weak because there was no information on the 
research conducted before developing the safe conduct passes. Also, just as with safe 
conduct passes, it can be said that the Eighth Army‘s Psychological Warfare Division 
lacked the proper resources needed in acquiring the in-depth knowledge of the TA that 
was needed.  The Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War states that: 
EUSAK [Eighth United States Army in Korea] Psywar has little or no 
library…there is actually no library for the division as a whole.  The 
Projects Group does, however, have a small collection of materials and 
books.  These include three Hong-Kong newspapers, Chinese and Soviet 
picture magazines, several books on China and Korea (e.g., Crow‘s Five 
Hundred Million Customers, Osgood‘s Ethnology of Korea), Chinese and 
                                                 
99 Kilchoon Kim and E.A. Johnson, Evaluation of Effects of Leaflets on Early North Korean Prisoners 
of War (ORO, Baltimore:  20 February 1951), 7-8; John Ponturo, Psychological Operations at Lower 
Echelons in Eighth Army, July 1952-July 1953 (ORO, Baltimore:  25 January 1953), 53-56, cited by 
Stanley Sandler, ―Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You!”: A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological 
Operations (Fort Bragg, NC:  U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 
9, 1999), 225. 
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Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 226. 
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Korean dictionaries, Army psywar manuals, Linebarger‘s Psychological 
Warfare, a college textbook on psychology and collections of the speeches 
of Mao Tse-tung and Ghu The, as well as official reports of various 
kinds.102 
Although the Eighth Army initially lacked the required resources needed 
to better understand the TA, by the summer of 1951, the 1
st
 Leaflet & Loudspeaker 
Company had aquired ―more than 139 military, civilian and indigenous personnel, (which 
included 10 professional Chinese and Korean translators and interviewers).‖103 These 
indigenous personnel and professional translators helped in the development of 
loudspeaker scripts, thus reducing semantic noise. Thus, the in-depth knowledge of the 
TA improved over time and with the acquisition of indigenous help. 
2. Message:  The message of choice by the loudspeaker teams was the 
surrender appeal.  Examples of broadcasted statements include: 
Soon you will be committed to battle again to be sacrificed in the UN‘s 
sea of fire.  Think of the thousands and thousands of your comrades who 
have already died for nothing in this foreign land.  Friends, be wise, come 
to the UN lines, at the first opportunity you are guaranteed good treatment. 
Or 
Here‘s how to escape and come to UN lines.  Listen carefully to the 
instruction which follows…Listen carefully…This is the way to escape 
your unit and come over to the UN lines:…‖104 
Sandler claims that ―typical U.S. loudspeaker messages avoided overt 
political themes and usually offered a way out for the individual enemy soldier.‖ 
Furthermore, because indigenous personnel and professional translators were used, the 
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messages were easy to understand and did not have semantic noise introduced 
unknowingly by U.S. forces.  Messages were kept short, between 60 to 90 seconds, and 
followed the following guidelines; 
1.  Be used as a tactical weapon, with no lofty strategic (or ―political‖) 
messages (―End the War!‖ ―Fight Communism!‖). 
2.  Use simple, easy-to-understand messages. 
3.  Take a firm note. 
4.  Always repeat ―punch line.‖ 
5.  Sound ―official‖ in tone and language. 
6.  Personalize target, by name, if possible. 
7.  Give directions on how to surrender. 
8.  Preface message with English-language warning to friendly forces not 
to shoot defectors coming across the lines (easier said than done). 
9.  Give up-to-date news. 
10.  Use native-speakers if at all possible, to avoid foreign accent.105 
3. Channel/Medium:  Along with leaflets, the medium that was chosen to 
carry the surrender message was the loudspeaker.  With the range it had, loudspeakers 
were particularly useful on the front lines. It can be inferred that these broadcasts were 
threatening to enemy troops because loudspeaker broadcasts were fired upon by the 
enemy.  According to Sandler, one study reported, ―Hardly a day went by during the last 
year of the war without reports that the enemy had countered broadcasts with a generous 
amount of mortar or artillery rounds…a good many of the ground loud-speakers…were 
                                                 
105 ―Student Summary, Army General Ground School‖, Conference on Loudspeakers, Air Dropped 
Newspapers, n.d., in Vatcher Papers, box 11, ―Korean War‖ folder, cited by Stanley Sandler, ―Cease 
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destroyed by enemy counter fire.‖106  Also, because the loudspeakers were so effective in 
reaching the enemy, Communist officers usually ordered their men to make noise to 
drown out the broadcast.  Soldiers were told to fire their weapons, bang on containers, 
ring bells, and sing in hopes that they would not be able to hear the message.107 These 
activities point to both the effectiveness of the medium in reaching the enemy and the 
message it carried. 
4. Receiver/TA:  As with the safe conduct pass leaflets, the intended TA 
was enemy troops.    Loudspeaker surrender appeals seemed to work best after a major 
offensive took place.  Sandler again observes: ―After the 3rd Division‘s task force had 
flanked and decimated the targeted enemy, the loudspeaker team chief drew up a ―threat-
surrender‖ message for the survivors and ―many‖ enemy troops surrendered.‖108  
Sandler reports that ―From January 1951 to the Armistice of 27 July 1953, 
8
th
 Army loudspeaker teams made 20,000 distinct broadcasts‖109  Although General 
McClure, who was head of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, ―claimed 
that something like one-third of enemy surrenderees had been ―influenced in their 
decision‖ by U.S. psywar,‖110 it is not known how many of them surrendered because of 
loudspeaker broadcasts.  However, one can come to the conclusion that loudspeaker 
broadcasts could account for a fair amount of these surrenders based on the large number 
of broadcasts made. 
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b. Loudspeaker Surrender Appeal PSYOP Matrix  
Using the PSYOP model and matrix to analyze the loudspeaker surrender 
appeal yields the following findings. In this case, two of the four variables—message and 
medium—are considered strong and the other two—in-depth knowledge of the TA and 
the receptiveness of the TA—are considered weak. (See Figure 10.) 
As with leaflets, the use of loudspeaker surrender appeals correlated with 
high numbers of defectees.  This can be observed by taking in to account the number of 
broadcasts made throughout the war and the number of enemy personnel who 
surrendered. As stated earlier, it is estimated that more than 100,000 enemy troops 
surrendered due to U.S. PSYWAR and over 20,000 distinct broadcasts were made 
directed toward enemy troops.  From this information, one can infer that the loudspeaker 




Figure 10.    PSYOP Matrix (Loudspeaker Surrender Appeal) 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Out of the three cases analyzed, none of them had four strong variables.  One case 
had four weak variables, Operation Moolah, one case had three strong variables, and one 
weak variable, safe conduct pass leaflet, and one case had two strong variables and two 
weak variables, loudspeaker surrender appeals.  In-depth knowledge of the TA was weak 
in all three.  Message was weak in one, Operation Moolah, and strong in the other two, 
safe conduct pass leaflet and loudspeaker surrender appeal.  Medium was weak in one, 
Operation Moolah, and strong in the other two, safe conduct pass leaflet and loudspeaker 
surrender appeal.  Receptiveness of the TA was weak in two, Operation Moolah and 
loudspeaker surrender appeal, and strong in one, safe conduct pass.  The findings are 








Figure 11.   Summary of Findings 
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V. CONCLUSION 
After analyzing communication theory and applying the PSYOP model and 
matrix to three cases of tactical PSYOP in the Korean War, this thesis offers the 
following general conclusions. First, PSYOP is not successful when all four variables are 
weak in the PSYOP message.  Second, successful PSYOP is possible, when there are two 
or more strong variables present in the operation.  Finally, since the three case studies can 
be classified as tactical PSYOP,111 the general conclusions made here cannot be applied 
to strategic or operational PSYOP. Each of these points will be elaborated below.   
A. THE FOUR VARIABLES 
The strength of the four variables studied in this thesis—in-depth knowledge of 
the TA, the message, the medium, and the receptiveness of the TA—offers insights on 
the potential success of a given PSYOP operation.  
1. In-Depth Knowledge of the TA 
In all three cases, in-depth knowledge of the TA was weak.  One can come to the 
conclusion that, for tactical PSYOP, in-depth knowledge of the TA is not necessary for 
tactical level PSYOP; the PSYOP planner only needs to have a basic knowledge of the 
TA in order to be effective.   
The following questions can provide the basic knowledge that the PSYOP planner 
needs of the TA to execute successful tactical PSYOP: 
 Can the TA read? 
 Can the TA understand basic drawings and pictures? 
 What conditions, such as weak leadership, lack of food and medical care, 
fear of death, or lack of training, can be exploited to cause the TA to 
surrender? 
 What medium can best reach the TA? 
                                                 
111  The overall intent of the cases was to cause the enemy to surrender or defect. 
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There may be more questions but, with these basic four questions, the PSYOP planner 
will gain enough knowledge of the TA to craft an effective PSYOP message. 
2. Message 
In two of the cases, the message was strong.  These two cases, safe conduct pass 
leaflets and loudspeaker surrender appeal, were successful in influencing the TA to 
surrender.  By contrast, a weak message, which was present in Operation Moolah, caused 
that operation to be unsuccessful.  From these cases, one can conclude that, for tactical 
PSYOP, the message needs to be strong in order for the PSYOP operation to be 
successful.  The message is considered strong when it does not contain semantic noise, 
the TA is able to understand it, and the proper conditions, vulnerabilities, legitimate 
appeals, persuasion techniques, and influence tactics are used when it is crafted. 
3. Medium 
In two of the cases—safe conduct pass leaflets and loudspeaker surrender 
appeal—the medium correctly fit the operation and therefore was strong.   Operation 
Moolah, by contrast, had an ineffective medium, which contributed to its lack of success. 
From these observations, one can conclude that, for tactical PSYOP, the medium needs to 
be strong in order for the PSYOP operation to be successful.  The medium is considered 
strong when it is able to reach a majority of the TA, and it has credibility. For example, 
the TA need to be literate in order to read a leaflet with words.  
4. Receptiveness of the TA 
In two of the cases, receptiveness of the TA was weak.  Of these two cases, 
loudspeaker surrender appeal and Operation Moolah, only loudspeaker surrender appeal 
was successful in influencing the TA to surrender; Operation Moolah was unsuccessful.  
A strong receptiveness of the TA, identified in safe conduct pass leaflet, is necessary for 
tactical PSYOP to be successful.  Receptiveness of the TA is considered strong when the 
TA is open to arguments, ideas, or change. 
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B. THE THREE CASES 
1. Operation Moolah 
Analysis of Operation Moolah shows that if all four variables are weak, then the 
PSYOP operation will be unsuccessful.  Even though the unintended effects of the 
operation were profoundly positive, the operation‘s goal—influencing a Soviet or North 
Korean pilot to defect with a combat capable MiG-15 jetfighter—was not met.   
2. Safe Conduct Pass Leaflets 
For both safe conduct pass leaflets and loudspeaker surrender appeal, in-depth 
knowledge of the TA was weak. However, a basic knowledge of the TA allowed the 
PSYOP planner to choose the right medium and craft the right message to be successful. 
Analysis of the safe conduct pass leaflets demonstrates that if the two or more variables 
that are strong include the message and the medium, then the likelihood of the PSYOP 
operation‘s success will increase.   The fourth variable, receptiveness of the TA, is more 
complicated. Ultimately, enemy soldiers were receptive to the message and surrendered 
in large numbers. However, it is unclear whether they were receptive when they received 
the message, or became receptive over time   Further analysis of this variable can bring 
about insights as to how receptive the TA was when the safe conduct pass leaflet was 
dropped.   
3. Loudspeaker Surrender Appeal 
Analysis of the loudspeaker surrender appeal also demonstrates that if the two or 
more variables that are strong include message and medium, then the likelihood of the 
PSYOP‘s message will be successful increases.  Analysis of the fourth variable, 
receptiveness of the TA, shows that loudspeaker surrender appeal was most effective 
when it was broadcasted to the TA after a major attack or aerial bombardment.  In other 
words, the TA‘s receptiveness of the loudspeaker surrender appeal significantly changed 
after friendly forces did something to cause them to want to surrender.  The TA‘s original 
conditions were not enough to cause them to be open to the idea of surrendering.  As with 
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safe conduct pass leaflets and Operation Moolah, in-depth knowledge of the TA was also 
weak.  However, a basic knowledge of the TA allowed the PSYOP planner to choose the 
right medium and craft the right message, aiding in the success of the operation. 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYOP TODAY 
The practitioners of PSYOP today can learn from both successful and 
unsuccessful PSYOP from past operations. These cases offer valuable insights on what 
the PSYOP planner needs to focus their time and effort.  For tactical PSYOP, the 
importance of a strong message and the choice of a strong medium can cause the 
operation to be successful; in-depth knowledge of the TA is not necessarily needed while 
executing tactical PSYOP. Second, receptiveness of the TA can be further enhanced 
when friendly forces do something before the PSYOP is executed. Further analysis of in-
depth knowledge of the TA for strategic and operational PSYOP is needed in order to 
understand its importance for PSYOP operations at this level.   
Furthermore, PSYOP planners can improve the effectiveness of their PSYOP 
products by applying the model and matrix presented in this thesis to their planning 
process.  Specifically, PSYOP planners can compare the PSYOP matrix with their 
operation and make changes accordingly to any weak variables that they identify. 
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